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PREVIEW: City of Kalispell v. Thomas Salsgiver: Can a 
Default of Appearance Waive the Right to a Jury Trial for a 
“Serious” Misdemeanor? 
Britton Fraser 
 Oral argument is scheduled for 9:30 a.m. on Friday, April 5, 
2019 at the University of Montana’s George Dennison Theater in 
Missoula. Appearing for the Appellant is Nick Aemisseger, 
Regional Deputy Public Defender. Appearing for Appellee is Brad 
Fjeldheim, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Montana.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
City of Kalispell v. Thomas Salsgiver asks the Court to 
decide whether the Montana Constitution’s waiver of the right to 
jury trial by default of appearance, when applied to a “serious” 
misdemeanor, violates the federal constitutional right to a jury trial.1   
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Thomas Salsgiver was arrested on March 17, 2015 on one 
count of Partner Family Member Assault (“PFMA”) and one count 
of Criminal Mischief.2 Because it was Salsgiver’s first PFMA 
charge, it constituted a misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of 
one year in prison.3 At his arraignment, Salsgiver signed an Order 
for Conditions of Release that required him to “personally appear 
for all court proceedings” and warned that his “[f]ailure to appear 
[would] result in a waiver of jury trial.”4 The municipal court 
informed him of the date and time of the next hearing.5 On the date 
of the hearing, Salsgiver failed to personally appear, but his public 
defender was present;  the municipal court scheduled a bench trial 
                                                          
1 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, City of Kalispell v. Salsgiver, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/5/842/url/321Z246_03WCC
VM23003RME.pdf (Mont. Jan. 5, 2018) (No. DA 16-0445); Order at 1, City of 
Kalispell v. Salsgiver, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector 
/8/890/url/321Z31S_0C35QCM1D000006.pdf (Mont. Jan. 25, 2019) (No. DA 
16-0445). Salsgiver also appeals aspects of the fines and incarceration imposed 
by the municipal court. However, the Supreme Court’s Order requesting 
supplemental briefs indicates that its focus will be the jury trial right under the 
Montana and U.S. Constitutions.   
2 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 1.   
3 Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206 (2019).  
4 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2.  
5 Id.  




and issued a warrant for Salsgiver’s arrest.6 The trial date eventually 
fell on November 12, 2015.7 
 
About six months later, authorities arrested Salsgiver 
pursuant to the bench warrant, and the municipal court arraigned 
him, informed him of his trial date, and released him.8 After his 
release, Salsgiver filed a motion for jury trial, arguing that his failure 
to appear was not a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of 
his right to a jury trial as the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution requires, but the municipal court denied the motion.9 
At the bench trial, Salsgiver continued to object that he never waived 
his right to a jury trial; nonetheless, the trial continued, and the 
municipal court found him guilty on both charges.10  
 
Salsgiver appealed to the district court on two issues: first, 
whether a defendant charged with a crime carrying a maximum 
sentence of one year has a right to a jury trial under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and 
second,  if so, whether the State met its burden to show a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of that right.11 The district court 
concluded that Salsgiver’s failure to appear despite the municipal 
court’s warning about the consequence of his absence was a 
sufficient reason to revoke his right to a jury trial.12 Salsgiver 
appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.13  
 
III.  SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
 
A.  Appellant Thomas Salsgiver 
 
Salsgiver argues that in matters involving a “serious” 
offense, under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant may only waive 
the jury trial right knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.14 Citing 
                                                          
6 Id. at 4–5.   
7 Appellee’s Response Brief at 4, City of Kalispell v. Salsgiver, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/!toCaseResults?documentId=321Z27J_06F
MBXD1F00000S&fileType=pdf (Mont. June 17, 2018) (No. DA 16-0445). 
8 Id. at 4–5.  
9 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 5–6; Appellee’s Response 
Brief, supra note 7, at 5.  
10 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 6–7.  
11 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 7, at 10.  
12 Id. at 11–14. 
13 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 10. 
14 Id. at 12–13. See also, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) 
(establishing that federal constitutional waivers are only valid if made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, which means that the defendant must 
have the capacity to understand the rights he is waiving and his waiver may not 
be coerced). 
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Duncan v. Louisiana,15 he defines a “serious” offense as one that 
carries a possibility of more than six months in prison, regardless of 
whether it is classified as a misdemeanor or felony.16 Salsgiver also 
argues the waiver provision in the Order for Conditions of Release 
he signed did not constitute a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver of a jury trial.17 He emphasizes that waiver “may not be 
accepted . . . unless . . . made with a full awareness of both the nature 
of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision 
to abandon it” and that it must be “a free and deliberate choice rather 
than intimidation, coercion or deception;”18 Salsgiver argues that 
signing a form as a condition of being released, without counsel 
present, is not a “free and deliberate choice.”19  
 
In contrast, rather than articulating a standard for waiver like 
the federal system, the Montana Constitution provides for waiver of 
the jury right by default of appearance.20 Salsgiver points out that 
the Montana cases on which the City of Kalispell relies only allow 
waiver by default of appearance in cases involving “petty” 
offenses—not the “serious” PFMA offense Salsgiver faced.21 When 
applied to “serious” offenses, Salsgiver argues that the waiver 
provision under the Montana Constitution is superseded by the U.S. 
Constitution’s requirement that a defendant facing a serious charge 
can only waive his jury trial right knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily.22 He contends that “mistake and negligence” cannot 
form the basis of waiver.23 
 
B.  Appellee City of Kalispell 
 
The City of Kalispell (“the City”) concedes that Salsgiver 
had a right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment and Montana 
Constitution for the PFMA charge.24 However, it argues that 
Salsgiver’s default of appearance at the Omnibus Hearing was a 
                                                          
 15 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 
66, 69 (1970).   
16 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15–16.  
17 Id. at 25.  
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 25–27 (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
20 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26. 
21 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 16–17; see also City of 
Missoula v. Cox, 196 P.3d 452 (Mont. 2008); State v. Trier, 277 P.3d 1230 
(Mont. 2012); City of Missoula v. Girard, 303 P.3d 1283 (Mont. 2013).   
22 Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 2–5, City of Kalispell v. 
Salsgiver, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/!toCaseResults?documentId 
=321Z32P_0CRR0YEDT000006&fileType=pdf (Mont. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. DA 
16-0445).  
23 Id. at 8–9.  
24 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 7, at 17.  




valid waiver under both the Montana and the federal constitutions.25 
In support, the City contends that no specific form of waiver is 
required for a defendant to validly waive his jury trial right.26 
Furthermore, it argues that federal courts have upheld Sixth 
Amendment waivers “when a court orders a defendant’s compliance 
and the defendant violates that order.”27 The City claims that when 
Salsgiver signed  and then violated the conditions of release form 
that required his personal appearance at all court proceedings, he 
implicitly waived his jury trial right.28  
 
This waiver, according to the City, was made knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily, and was consequently valid under the 
U.S. and Montana Constitutions.29 It argues that Montana’s totality 
of the circumstances test set forth in State v. McCartney30 
appropriately determines valid waivers in misdemeanor offenses.31 
The City also asserts there is nothing in the record to suggest 
Salsgiver either signed the conditions of release or failed to appear 
involuntarily.32 It argues that he waived his right knowingly and 
intelligently in compliance with the Sixth Amendment.33 Because  
Salsgiver  signed both an initial statement of rights that reflected his 
right to trial by jury and a conditions of release form that stated he 
would waive the right to jury by failure to appear, the City asserts 
that he knew that his failure to appear would waive his right to a jury 
trial.34 Additionally, the City cites the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann35 to 
support its contention that absence of counsel does not prohibit a 
defendant from validly waiving his right to a jury trial.36 The City 
concludes that the totality of circumstances demonstrate that 
Salsgiver’s default of appearance was a valid waiver under 
Montana’s constitution, and his signature on court documents 
                                                          
25 Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 2, City of Kalispell v. Salsgiver, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/!toCaseResults?documentId=321Z32T_0CV
PCYH83000006&fileType=pdf (Mont. Feb. 25, 2019) (DA 16-0445).  
26 Id. at 3; see also United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 1985).  
27 Supplemental Brief of Appellee, supra note 25, at 4; see also United 
States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099–1101 (3rd Cir. 1995).  
28 Supplemental Brief, of Appellee supra note 25, at 7.  
29 Id. at 10.  
30 585 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Mont. 1978). 
31 Supplemental Brief of Appellee, supra note 25, at 11, citing 
McCartney, 585 P.2d at 1325. 
32 Id. at 16.  
33 Id. at 17.  
34 Id. at 19; See, e.g. State v. Walker, 188 P.3d 1069, 1076 (Mont. 
2008) (holding that documents signed by a defendant may be used to 
demonstrate awareness of individual rights). 
35 317 U.S. 269, 272–73 (1948).    
36 Supplemental Brief of Appellee, supra note 25, at 20. 
92              MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE              Vol. 79 
demonstrated a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his 
right to jury trial under the federal constitution.37 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
 Both the City and Salsgiver concede that the Montana 
Constitution is unambiguous that upon default of appearance a case 
may be tried without a jury.38 For felony matters,39 the Montana 
Supreme Court has previously ruled that waiver may only be 
accomplished upon written consent of the parties, as well as have 
been made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.40 In the federal 
system, courts have allowed waiver of the right to a jury trial to take 
a variety of forms, but the fundamental right to a jury trial extends 
to crimes punishable by six months or more of imprisonment.41  
 
 Until this matter, the default of appearance provision of the 
Montana Constitution had only been applied to cases involving 
crimes with less than six months of imprisonment, which 
consequently did not implicate the federal right to a jury trial.42 
Therefore, the Montana Supreme Court must determine whether, 
when applied to crimes with a potential sentence of six months or 
more of imprisonment, Article II’s default of appearance provision 
infringes upon a defendant’s right to a jury trial under the U.S. 
Constitution.  
 
Salsgiver advocates applying the totality of the 
circumstances test from McCartney to require a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver for these “serious” misdemeanors. 
This is a different approach from previous Montana cases involving 
waiver by default of appearance, which did not implicate any federal 
rights, so the Court only asked whether the defendant demonstrated 
an inability to comply with the court order mandating personal 
appearance.43 Yet, the City’s contention that no specific form or 
mode of waiver is necessary to waive a federal right seems just as 
applicable to the matter as a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
analysis. Therefore, to account for this new area that has not yet 
                                                          
37 Id.  
38 Supplemental Brief of Appellant, supra note 18, at 5–6; 
Supplemental Brief of Appellee, supra note 20, at 2; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26.    
 39 MONT. CODE ANN. 45–2–101(23) (establishing that crimes in which 
the sentence imposed upon conviction is death or imprisonment in a state prison 
for a term exceeding one year). 
40 State v. Dahlin, 289 Mont. 182, 188 (1998); State v. Reim, 374 
Mont. 487, 498 (2014); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–16–110(3). 
41 Singer v. U.S., 380 U.S. 24, 36–37 (1965); Baldwin v. New York, 
399 U.S. 66, 68–69 (1970).  
42 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 16. 
43 Supplemental Brief of Appellant, supra note 22, at 10.  




come before the Court, the Court could address the intersection of 
the federal and Montana constitutional rights by essentially creating 
a three “tiered” classification for waivers of the jury trial right.44 The 
first tier would remain waiver by default of appearance for “petty” 
offenses, which both parties agree is valid under the Montana and 
federal Constitutions. The second tier would address the ostensible 
area of conflict between the two constitutions, which would allow 
for a waiver by default of appearance to be valid if it was knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made.45 This is the classification at-
issue here. The third tier would encompass waiver in felony cases, 
which is already addressed through Montana statutes and the U.S. 
Constitution.46 
 
If applied here, the McCarthy standard of a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver based on the totality of the 
circumstances would likely favor the City. Salsgiver’s claim that 
signing the conditions of release form was not a “free and 
deliberate” choice is misplaced; the relevant, uncoerced choice was 
Salsgiver’s failure to appear at the hearing because that was when 
he allegedly waived his jury trial right. Although there may have 
been an element of coercion involved when Salsgiver signed the 
conditions of release form, it is likely not enough to overcome the 
warnings contained in the conditions of release that speak to the 
“knowing and intelligent” part of the analysis. These provisions 
warned Salsgiver of the consequence of his failure to appear, which 
is a separate inquiry from whether the actual failure to appear was 
“voluntary” or not.47 
 
Relying on the Johnson standard for valid federal 
constitutional waivers, the City’s argument that Salsgiver’s 
                                                          
44 This “tiered” system is not explicitly mentioned by either party but 
could be the natural result of Appellee’s reasoning and strike a balance between 
the provisions of Article II § 26 of Montana’s Constitution and the Sixth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  
45 This would be unlike the standard for waiver by default of 
appearances for “petty” offenses, as in those cases the burden of proof is on the 
defendant to show some inability to comply with the court order to be present at 
the proceeding. Here, the burden to show waiver would switch to the State to 
demonstrate the knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. See U.S. v. Miller, 
382 F. Supp. 2d 350, 362 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing burden-shifting in 
Miranda waivers). 
46 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–16–110(3); Singer v. U.S., 380 U.S. 24, 
(1965).  
47 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (discussing how 
“voluntarily” and “knowingly and intelligently” are analyzed separately in 
Miranda waivers); State v. Nixon, 298 P.3d 408, 417 (Mont. 2013) (discussing 
the same distinction between “voluntarily” and “knowingly and intelligently” 
for state-level Miranda waivers). 
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acceptance of the conditions of release and default of appearance 
was made knowingly and intelligently would likely succeed in the 
proposed second-tier classification. The documents informed 
Salsgiver of his right to a jury trial and warned him he would waive 
that right by failing to appear; Salsgiver likely met the knowing and 
voluntary requirements because his signature after reading the 
documents evidenced his awareness of his rights and how they could 
be lost.48 However, the City presents no evidence that Salsgiver 
voluntarily failed to appear.49 This may not be dispositive, however, 
as the Court may find that, in the absence of any “intimidation, 
coercion, or deception” preventing Salsgiver from appearing, his 
awareness of the consequence of failing to attend demonstrates his 
voluntary choice not to appear.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The three-tiered classification system is one possible 
analytical framework through which the Supreme Court may resolve 
this dispute. At the very least, it is likely that the Court will find that 
the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary standard to demonstrate 
waiver applies to crimes in Montana that carry a sentence of six 
months or more. With that standard in mind, the voluntariness of 
Salsgiver’s failure to appear will likely be the linchpin deciding the 
outcome of this matter.  
                                                          
48 Supplemental Brief of Appellee, supra note 25, at 19; see also State 
v. Walker, 188 P.3d 1069, 1076–77 (Mont. 2008) (finding that explaining all the 
“nuances or effects of waiving the right to a jury trial is unnecessary”). 
49 Supplemental Brief of Appellee, supra note 25, at 16–17.  
